freenode
Distributions & Plumbing

Compromised CAs linger in Debian packages that ship their own stores

A ClamAV scan found distrusted eMudhra and Comodo certificates still embedded in pip, Node, NSS and others, prompting a push to ban vendored trust bundles.

Debian packages that ship their own certificate bundles are still carrying distrusted eMudhra and Comodo certificate authorities, long after the system trust store was updated. Enrico Zini reported the findings on the Debian development list after writing an unofficial ClamAV signature that matches PEM text, public-key material and binary encodings of the compromised certificates.

On systems he had installed, the scan hit pip (including its vendored certifi bundle and a wheel), gRPC, Node, NSS, botocore, awscli, Qt WebEngine and TeX Live's installer curl bundle. Zini said the list was limited to packages he happened to have, and that containers, Flatpaks, virtualenvs and other vendored trees were a separate problem. "This feels a lot bigger than I can handle," he wrote.

The practical consequence is that updating ca-certificates does not clean these copies. Steve McIntyre called embedding private trust stores "this awful anti-pattern" and "a security nightmare": noting that known-bad certificates remain after updates. He said he was scanning a local Debian mirror for more hits. Henrique de Moraes Holschuh suggested rebuilding affected packages so they pick up a current ca-certificates, with binary-only rebuilds as a short-term path where that works.

Marco d'Itri argued for policy that applications must use the system store, and that difficulty is not a reason to leave the easy cases unfixed. In most cases, he wrote, the embedded bundle can be replaced at build time with a symlink. Josh Triplett agreed that full stores should not be embedded for arbitrary URLs, but said a single pinned CA can be reasonable when an application talks only to one service. Philipp Kern replied that a CA still has to be replaceable, and that administrators need that agility. d'Itri later said CA pinning would be out of scope, and that consensus is against it.

Simon Josefsson pointed to a related case: Go's crypto library in Debian embeds a large default CA set. Zini circulated a draft policy change that would treat CA certificates and timezone data like other embedded copies: packages should not ship their own versions without a documented reason, because a compromise or a data update then cannot be fixed in one place. Salvo Tomaselli wanted exceptions to be harder to obtain. Andrea Pappacoda asked the wording to distinguish a source package's private database from a binary that is rebuilt from the system tzdata, which can be refreshed with a binary rebuild. Separately, a feature request was filed so the adequate checker can warn when packages embed these keys.